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Abstract 
In pragmatic language, there is an intentional distinction between the literal meaning of what 
is said, and what the speaker actually means.  Previous neuroimaging investigations of 
pragmatic language have contrasted it with literal language; however, such contrasts may 
have been confounded by the higher levels of ambiguity in pragmatic language.  Here, we 
used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to compare pragmatic (i.e. intentionally 
ambiguous) language with ambiguous (i.e. unintentionally ambiguous), as opposed to literal, 
language.  Analysis showed that ambiguous language activated brain areas recognized to play 
a role in generating a theory of mind (ToM) that have previously been argued to support 
understanding of pragmatic language, specifically medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), and temporoparietal junction (TPJ).  In contrast, pragmatic language 
drew on anterior temporal, superior parietal lobule, in addition to precuneus. While no effect 
of gender was found for ambiguous language, females showed greater activity than males 
within mPFC and IFG for pragmatic language – regions thought to be involved in cognitive 
and affective empathy, respectively. Findings suggest that while areas underpinning ToM are 
sufficient to support meaning derivation in the context of ambiguity, reasoning about 
pragmatic intent is more reliant on access to self-referential memory.   
Key words: pragmatic language, fMRI, theory of mind, ambiguous language, sex differences 
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Introduction 
Within everyday communication, the sheer complexity of human language often 
necessitates a level of decoding that goes beyond first-order lexical processing, where certain 
utterances must instead be placed into context in order to decipher a second-order, non-literal 
meaning. Pragmatic language is language where there exists a clear and intentional 
distinction between the literal meaning of what is said and what the speaker actually means 
(Jang et al., 2013). Irony, metaphor and hinting are common everyday forms of pragmatic 
language. Such utterances, though highly ambiguous, are distinct from utterances which are 
simply unclear in that the ambiguity differs in function and is related both to the intentional 
stance of the utterer and the specifics of the context. The aim of this study was to identify 
brain areas that support reasoning about the intent of pragmatic language. 
Early linguistic research into pragmatic language has demonstrated that pragmatic 
utterances can be understood as easily and as automatically as their literal counterparts 
(Glucksberg, 2003), suggesting that the ability to decode their meaning is an integral part of 
human communication.  Pragmatic language, though highly ambiguous, is distinct from 
ambiguous language more generally. While pragmatic language is intentionality ambiguous, 
ambiguous language is unintentionally ambiguous; that is, the speaker is being 
unintentionally unclear.  Recent linguistic models have suggested that understanding 
pragmatic language draws on additional neural support beyond the traditional language 
system (Ferstl et al., 2008). Such accounts are supported by investigations into instances in 
which deficits in pragmatic language comprehension are apparent, such as in  individuals 
with a schizophrenia diagnosis, who demonstrate no differences compared with controls in 
literal sentence comprehension (Frith, 1994; Langdon et al., 2002a).  Beyond the literal 
interpretation of words, understanding pragmatic language requires the listener to decode the 
associations between content, context, and knowledge on the speaker; thus, the additional 
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mechanism supporting interpretation of pragmatic language is argued to be the ability to 
mentally construct a theory of another’s mind, given a set a known variables (Frith & Frith, 
2003). 
More broadly, constructing a theory of mind (ToM) refers to our capacity to hold our 
understanding of others’ beliefs as separate to our own, in addition to their thoughts, feelings, 
and intentions in a given moment (Frith & Frith, 1999).  ToM is the avenue through which 
we perceive the world from another’s perspective.  The ambiguity of pragmatic language is 
arguably resolved when we can mentally represent the state of a speaker while also 
processing what they say, allowing the meaning derived to be shaped by the speaker’s 
experience. Consistent with ToM supporting pragmatic language comprehension, accuracy in 
the interpretation of pragmatic sentences correlates with performance in ToM tasks (e.g. 
Fernández, 2013; Pijnacker et al., 2012). Investigations into neuropsychiatric (Corcoran, 
Mercer & Frith, 1995) and neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. Langdon et al., 2002b; 
Norbury, 2005) also support this view, demonstrating a relationship between selective 
deficits in pragmatic language comprehension and ToM ability in both schizophrenic patients 
and children with autism.  
Although ToM is associated with a distributed network of cortical regions (reviewed 
by Carrington & Bailey, 2009 and Lieberman, 2007; also see meta-analysis by Schurz et al., 
2014 and Van Overwalle, 2009), the core constituents of ToM that are continually reported, 
irrespective of task or stimulus formats, include medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and precuneus. Activity in 
these areas is evident in the processing of pragmatic language, consistent with the 
involvement of ToM in pragmatic language comprehension. Using positron emission 
tomography, Bottini et al (1994) asked participants to make plausibility judgements about 
sentences that were either novel metaphors or literal true/false statements. The authors found 
5 
significant right-hemispheric activation, including an increased response in the mPFC, 
precuneus and PCC, during the processing of metaphors, all putative constituents of the ToM 
neural network (Mitchell, 2009). Further studies have demonstrated a role for temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), mPFC, and precuneus in the processing of ironic compared to literal 
sentences (Shibata et al., 2010; Spotorno et al., 2012). For example, Shibata et al (2010) 
showed that, compared to literal sentences, ironic sentences generated higher activation in 
right mPFC (BA10), in addition to right precentral (BA6) and left superior temporal sulcus 
(BA21). Based on the evidence, it would appear that core nodes of the ToM neural network –
the mPFC, TPJ, PCC, and precuneus– extending beyond the left hemisphere, support the 
more traditional language network in deriving meaning from pragmatic language. 
The current study diverges from previous studies in the choice of control sentences 
against which pragmatic sentences are compared. Past studies have contrasted pragmatic 
sentences with literal sentences; however, ambiguous language recruits right hemispheric 
brain regions in addition to the more typical left-language related regions (Rodd et al., 2005; 
Zempleni et al., 2007). Consequently, those brain regions identified by previous pragmatic 
versus literal sentences may be the result of processing ambiguity rather than the intentional 
processing characteristic of pragmatic language comprehension. In an effort to control for 
ambiguity here, pragmatic sentences (where the meaning is intentionality unclear) were 
contrasted with ambiguous sentences (where the meaning is unintentionally unclear) using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  Comprehension of ambiguous and 
pragmatic sentences have been contrasted previously in a non-clinical sample, and a sample 
of individuals with a schizophrenia diagnosis (Corcoran, 2003).  Comprehension of both 
sentence sets was positively correlated in the clinical sample, but not in the non-clinical one, 
suggesting that although both tasks involved some degree of ambiguity, non-clinical 
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participants utilized specialist skills tailored towards the processing of intentional ambiguity 
that is not used for decoding general ambiguity, whereas clinical participants did not. 
In an effort to understand more about the nature of activation differences between 
pragmatic and unintentionally ambiguous language, we also tested for sex differences here.  
Previous research indicates that the brains of females and males respond differently in tasks 
that require empathy (Brown et al., 1996), ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), and pragmatic 
language (Eriksson et al., 2012).  During such tasks, females typically show more activation 
in inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).  The IFG is reasoned to maintain contextual separation 
between representations that are similar; for example, it is active during the processing of 
metaphors (Eviatar & Just, 2006; Lee & Dapretto, 2006; Rapp et al., 2004; Shibata et al., 
2007; Stringaris et al., 2007).  Azim et al. (2005) found increased bilateral IFG response in 
women (compared to men) while processing humour. The region’s activity in tasks that tap 
into empathy has contributed to its inclusion in the emotional empathy network (Dapretto et 
al., 2006; Shulte-Ruther et al., 2008).  Greater IFG activation in females is consistent with a 
tendency to weigh-up another’s position from multiple-perspectives. Similarly, women 
showed greater activity in the left mPFC and greater bilaterally deactivation in the 
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC/orbitofrontal cortex) during a second-order false-belief task 
(Frank et al., 2015). However, no study has demonstrated neural differences between males 
and females during pragmatic language processing when accounting for unintentional 
ambiguity within the sentence. This study predicted no differences in neural activity between 
males and females for unintentional ambiguous sentences while sex differences were 
expected for the processing of pragmatic language.  
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Methods 
Participants 
A total of 27 participants (mean age=22.14.3years(yrs)) were recruited. Participants 
were approximately balanced for sex: 14 females (mean age=21.31.9yrs) and 13 males 
(mean age=22.95.9yrs). Participants spoke English as their first language and had no history 
of neuropsychological problems. All participants gave signed informed consent and were 
compensated for their time. The study was approved by the local research ethics committee. 
Design 
The fMRI task used to establish neural activation associated with processing 
pragmatic (intentionally ambiguous) and ambiguous (unintentionally ambiguous) language 
was developed by members of the research team. The task is based upon stimuli used in The 
Hinting Task (Corcoran et al., 1995) and the ambiguous sentences task from Corcoran 
(2003). Short text-based scenarios, where one character speaks to another within a particular 
context or circumstance, are presented. Two possible underlying meanings of the character’s 
utterance are then depicted visually by illustration, and the participants are required to select 
which alternative best represents the meaning of the utterance. In pragmatic scenarios, the 
character’s utterance has an intentional underlying non-literal meaning whereas in ambiguous 
scenarios there is no underlying intention. In order to control for individual differences in the 
salience of various names, the characters were referred to anonymously as ‘X’ or ‘Z’. For 
example, in the pragmatic scenario, “X has gone to buy groceries with his great uncle Z. X 
says, “Yum. Those toffees look delicious”.” This is then followed by the question, “What is 
X referring to?” along with two images, which the participant must choose from. Ambiguous 
scenarios follows the same format, for example, “X and Z are driving though the heavy rain. 
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X says, “I can’t see because the blades are worn”.” This is followed by the question, “What is 
X referring to?” along with two images, which the participant must choose from. All 
scenarios were presented in the center of the screen and were written in Calibri font. In 
accordance with the average reading speed for words on a computer screen (180 words per 
minute; Ziefle, 1998), 10 seconds (s) were given to read each scenario in both the pragmatic 
(Mean number of words per scenario=20.37, SD=1.7) and ambiguous (Mean number of 
words per scenario =20.04, SD=1.4) conditions.  
The task was designed and presented using Presentation software (Neurobehavioural 
Systems, CA, https://nbs.neuro-bs.com) and utilized a similar presentation design to that of 
Reniers et al. (2012). Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the time period and 
presentation sequence of a single trial. In each trial, the scenario along with the utterance was 
presented for 10s, followed by the two target pictures with a blue border surrounding each 
picture for 5s. After this time the border of the two pictures changed to red for 2s followed by 
a fixation cross for a duration of 2s. Participants used a button box to make their selection 
when the border around the two pictures turned to red using the index finger if the correct 
image was that on the left or the middle finger if the correct image was that on the right. 
After three consecutive trials, a rest block was presented for 10s, allowing the blood-oxygen-
level-dependent (BOLD) to return to baseline.  
 
Procedure  
Prior to performing the pragmatic and ambiguous language task in the scanner 
participants received instructions and training on the fMRI task. Training consisted of 
completing five practice trials after which a full understanding of the task requirements was 
checked.  In addition to the training task, participants completed the Questionnaire of 
Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers et al., 2011), which consists of 31 items, 
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used to assess cognitive and affective empathy. Cognitive empathy is the ability to construct 
a working model of the emotional states of others, whereas effective empathy is the ability to 
be sensitive to and vicariously experience the feelings of others. Items are rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale from 1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree, with higher scores indicating a 
greater degree of cognitive and/or emotional empathy.  
Participants also completed The Imposing Memory Task (IMT; Stiller & Dunbar, 
2007), used to measure their level of mentalizing capacity. A series of 5 stories (each 
consisting of 200 words) describing a social intervention involving several characters are 
presented. Immediately following each story, 20 true/false questions are given that require 
either complex mentalizing about a character’s perspective on a social situation 
(intentionality questions) or remembering factual information from the story (short-term 
memory). Complexity of the sentences is varied through, on the one hand, manipulating the 
distance between the central character, and the character’s perspective considered in the 
question (orders of intentionality; from 2
nd
 to 6
th
), and, on the other, through increasing the
number of facts to be remembered (from 2 to 6).  The level at which the respondent fails to 
correctly answer questions is calculated using a re-scaled weighted mean of performance at 
the 5 levels of complexity examined for both intentionality and memory and is outlined by 
Stiller and Dunbar (2007). Higher scores are indicative of greater intentionality or memory 
capacity. 
In total, the fMRI task consisted of 48 trials, which were divided into two separate 
runs each consisting of 12 ambiguous (A) and 12 pragmatic (P) scenarios. The order of 
presentation of trials was counterbalanced across two runs: run A and run B. The order of run 
A was: AAA REST PPP REST AAA REST PPP REST PPP REST AAA REST PPP REST 
AAA. The order of run B was: PPP REST AAA REST PPP REST AAA REST AAA REST 
PPP REST AAA REST PPP REST. Following scanning participants were presented with the 
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scenario’s outside the scanner and asked to rate, for each scenario, how familiar the scenario 
seemed, on a scale from 1 (not familiar at all) to 3 (very familiar) and how confident the 
participant felt they had interpreted the utterance correctly on a scale from 1 (not confident at 
all) to 3 (very confident). Separate familiarity and confidence scores were given for the 
pragmatic and ambiguous scenarios, with possible scores ranging from 24 to a maximum of 
72. 
Figure 1 should go here 
Data acquisition 
All fMRI data were acquired using a Siemens Trio 3 Tesla whole-body MRI system 
(Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany), with an eight-channel head coil. Functional 
images were acquired using a T2-weighted gradient echoplanar sequence (TE=30ms, 
TR=3000ms, flip angle 90°, FOV=192mm, slice thickness 2.7mm, 0.3mm gap, matrix 64x64, 
voxel size=3mm x 3mm x 2.7mm). Forty-three slices covering the whole brain were acquired 
axially, orientated parallel to the ACPC plane. Additional high resolution T1-weighted 
structural scans were acquired sagittally (TE=2.48ms, TR=7.92ms, flip angle 16°, 
FOV=asymmetric 256x240mm, 176 slices, matrix 256x256, isotropic voxel size=1mm x 
1mm x 1mm) for co-registration and to inspect for any potential structural abnormalities. 
Foam padding was placed inside the coil, at either side of the participant’s head, to minimize 
head movement and maximize participant comfort. 
Data analysis 
Behavioral data were analyzed using IBM SPSS version 24 (IBM SPSS) and fMRI 
data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
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Neurology, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first two images of each 
experimental run, during which the MR signal reaches a steady state, were discarded. Images 
were first realigned to correct for subject movement and then transformed into a standard 
anatomical space based on the ICBM template created by the Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI). This was achieved by first constructing a mean functional image for each subject 
from the realigned images. The T1-weighted image was then co-registered to the mean 
functional image and segmented. The grey matter segment was then normalized to the a 
priori grey matter MNI template. The resulting parameters were then subsequently applied to 
normalize the functional images into MNI space. The normalised images were then smoothed 
with an isotropic 6mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.  
Following stereotaxic normalization and smoothing statistical analysis was 
performed. The experimental (i.e. ambiguous, pragmatic and baseline) conditions were 
modelled using a boxcar function convolved with a hemodynamic response function (HRF) 
in the context of the general linear model (GLM). The conditions for each experimental run 
was entered as a different session, thus resulting into different session each with three 
conditions. Six motion parameters (i.e. roll, pitch, yaw; in x, y, z directions) were entered in 
the first level design matrix as regressors of no interest for each session. Contrast images for 
ambiguous>pragmatic and pragmatic>ambiguous were created from first level design 
matrices for each individual participant. The two contrast images were then entered into the 
second level full-factorial design matrix as a factor containing two levels. Age and sex were 
entered into the model as covariates along with scores for intentionality, cognitive and 
affective scores on the QCAE and an average score for confidence and familiarity measures 
obtained for pragmatic and ambiguous scenarios. The interaction term between sex and 
contrast condition was also entered. An example of the design matrix for first level 
(individual) and the design matrix for the second level (group) analysis can be found in 
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Supplementary material. Separate t-tests (FDR correction, P<0.05) using a cluster-level 
correction (Woo et al., 2014) were used to test for differences in the BOLD response between 
pragmatic and ambiguous sentences using a minimum cluster size of k=10 voxels. Regions of 
significant association were identified using the Wake Forest University Pickatlas 
(http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/cms/software#PickAtlas; Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004) using MNI 
coordinates of the most significant voxel (x,y,z mm). The MarsBar toolbox 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/; Brett et al (2002)) was used to create masks of the regions 
identified. The association between covariates and neural activity was tested for at a lower 
correction threshold (P<0.001, uncorrected, cluster-level) using the masks as regions of 
interest (ROI).  
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Results 
 
Behavioural results.  
Behavioural results for the key variables measured, including IMT intentionality and 
memory scores, cognitive and affective dimensions of the QCAE and familiarity and 
confidence scores for the ambiguous and pragmatic scenarios used in the fMRI task are 
shown in Table 1. Differences between males and females for the variables shown in Table 1 
were tested for using one-way ANOVA’s. Results showed females (mean=37.8±8.0) scored 
significantly higher than males (mean=31.4±6.3) on the affective dimension of the QCAE 
(F(1,25)=5.014, P=0.035). No other significant differences were found between males and 
females (P>0.05). Variances in familiarity and confidence scores for the ambiguous and 
pragmatic scenarios used in the fMRI task did not differ significantly from one another 
(P>0.05), indicating a similar distribution of scores. Results showed that participants were 
more confident with Ambiguous versus Pragmatic scenarios (P=0.001), but more familiar 
with Pragmatic versus Ambiguous scenarios (P<0.001). In addition, participants were 
significantly more confident than familiar with Ambiguous scenarios (P<0.001). However, 
for pragmatic scenarios, the reverse was true with participants scoring significantly higher for 
familiarity than confidence (P=0.002).  
 
Table 1 should go here  
 
FMRI results.  
Differences in the BOLD response between pragmatic and ambiguous sentences using 
a minimum cluster size of k=10 voxels (FDR, P<0.05). Table 2 shows brain regions 
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identified for the two contrasts performed, i.e. ambiguous > pragmatic scenarios and 
pragmatic > ambiguous scenario’s as well as sex differences for these two contrasts.  
 
Table 2 should go here  
 
Pragmatic scenarios (intentional ambiguity) 
The contrast pragmatic>ambiguous scenarios yielded activity in seven different 
regions across the left- and right-hemispheres shown in Figure 2. Specifically, greater activity 
was seen in left-hemisphere supplementary motor area [SMA] (BA6) and superior parietal 
lobule (BA5), right anterior temporal (BA21), precuneus (BA7), and superior parietal lobule 
(BA7), and bilateral superior occipital gyrus (BA19).  
 
Figure 2 should go here  
 
Ambiguous scenarios (unintentional ambiguity)  
Greater activation was observed for the contrast ambiguous>pragmatic scenarios in 
eight different regions shown in Figure 3. A neural response was found predominantly within 
left-hemisphere frontal cortex, including ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
[vmPFC]/orbitofrontal cortex (BA10) and mPFC (BA8). Greater activation for ambiguous 
scenarios was also found in left-hemisphere PCC (BA23) and TPJ (BA40), and right-
hemisphere mPFC (BA8), angular gyrus (BA39), lateral globus pallidus, and cerebellum 
posterior lobe, specifically inferior semilunar lobule. Though activity was found in mPFC 
(BA8) bilaterally, a far greater region was found in the left- versus the right-hemisphere (i.e. 
549 vs. 16 voxels).  
 
15 
Figure 3 should go here 
Sex differences 
The fifteen different regions identified when testing for differences between 
pragmatic and ambiguous scenarios where used as ROIs. Compared to males, females 
showed greater activity within left-hemisphere mPFC (BA10) and right-hemisphere inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) (BA44) for pragmatic language (shown in Figure 4). No differences 
between males and females were found for ambiguous compared to pragmatic scenario’s. No 
other significant associations were found for the remaining covariates in the model.  
Figure 4 should go here 
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Discussion 
Past studies that have examined the neural basis of interpreting pragmatic language 
have contrasted pragmatic scenarios with literal scenarios.  Two variables differentiate these 
stimulus categories: intention and ambiguity.  It is therefore unclear from past studies which 
areas support the identification of pragmatic intent, and those that support reasoning in the 
context of ambiguous language more generally.  Here, we contrasted the processing of 
pragmatic scenarios with ambiguous ones.  Many of the areas that have previously been 
reasoned to play a causal role in identifying the intent of pragmatic language (e.g. Shibata et 
al., 2010; Spotorno et al., 2012) were, in fact, more active during the processing of 
ambiguous scenarios.  Specifically, mPFC, TPJ, and PCC, core nodes of the ToM network, 
were more active during the processing of ambiguous scenarios.  In contrast, the precuneus, 
another node of the ToM network, was more active during the processing of pragmatic 
scenarios, along with anterior temporal, superior parietal lobule, and occipital areas.  
Findings suggest that many of the neural regions activated by previous pragmatic versus 
literal utterance comparisons may have resulted from more general ambiguity processing 
rather than from intentionally ambiguous processing characteristic of pragmatic language 
comprehension. 
ToM and reasoning in the context of ambiguity 
Participants’ task was to select between two options as to the meaning they felt the 
speaker intended.  MPFC, TPJ, and PCC were significantly more active while processing 
ambiguous sentences compared to pragmatic sentences. Reflecting on the characteristics of 
the stimuli, the ambiguous scenario itself, and both subsequent options were weakly related.  
Reasoning the speaker’s intent, and choosing which choice was more believably related to 
the scenario, were individually-based mentalising outcomes.  In contrast, the pragmatic 
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scenarios were strongly related to one particular mentalising outcome, and subsequent choice.  
Reasoning through the speaker’s intent in a pragmatic scenario, and making a subsequent 
choice, would plausibly have required reduced mentalising in contrast with the ambiguous 
scenarios.  Consistent with this, participants rated the pragmatic scenarios as being more 
familiar than the ambiguous ones. Additionally, despite being unintentionally ambiguous, a 
speaker’s non-literal and ambiguous utterance requires interpretation. A listener must still 
make inferences about the meaning and intention behind the utterance. On those basis 
scenarios which are less familiar would draw more upon those regions involved in iterative 
ToM processing than more familiar scenarios, which might explain why ambiguous 
sentences recruited significantly more activity in some core ToM nodes than pragmatic 
sentences.  
Support for the role of the mPFC in processing ambiguity comes from Jenkins and 
Mitchell (2008) who examined the neural constituents of the ToM network during tasks 
which drew upon two separate ToM functions: scenarios which involved identifying the 
mental intentions of characters with differing degrees of ambiguity, and mentalizing about 
different types of mental states (beliefs vs. preferences). They found that only the mPFC was 
consistently active during the processing of ambiguity, suggesting that this area is activated 
by more general ambiguity and not intention per se.  
The mPFC may be enabling more general inductive reasoning rather than pragmatic 
processing per se (Corcoran, 2003).  This is in line with several others who suggest the role 
for mPFC in ToM functions may be due to more general inductive reasoning in the face of 
ambiguity, which ToM processing inherently involves, rather than specifically reasoning 
about the mental states of others (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2002; Hartwright et al., 2014). Ferstl 
and von Cramon (2002), for example, found the mPFC to be involved in coherence 
processing for both ToM and non-ToM tasks that involved some degree of ambiguity. 
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Furthermore, patients with selective lesions to the mPFC do not demonstrate impaired 
performance on ToM tasks where all the information for determining a character’s mental 
state is available (Farrant et al., 2005). 
Of note here is the anatomical definition of mPFC, which typically includes BA’s 8, 9 
and 10, and in the review of Carrington and Bailey (2009) is inclusive of vmPFC and 
orbitofrontal cortex. The mPFC is consistently reported in ToM studies, however, it is often 
only poorly described by classical microanatomic boundaries that have been used somewhat 
inconsistently (Schurz et al., 2014). Within the ToM literature, it has been demonstrated that 
mPFC and vmPFC/orbitofrontal cortex are associated with distinct roles with 
vmPFC/orbitofrontal cortex being associated with empathy and mPFC with ToM (Sebastian 
et al., 2012).  Support for this comes from Shamay-Tsoory et al., (2010) who found that 
patients with orbitofrontal cortex damage are impaired in affective empathy but not in ToM.  
Here, processing of ambiguous language was more dependent on bilateral mPFC and left-
sided vmPFC, consistent with roles for both empathy and ToM in reasoning about intent in 
ambiguous language. 
Dorsal TPJ activity during the processing of ambiguous sentences here overlaps with 
activity related to the processing of false beliefs; for example, Gobbini et al (2007) showed 
that ToM tasks involving false-beliefs tend to activate the TPJ more dorsally than tasks 
without false-beliefs.  Similarly, Aichhorn et al (2006) showed that the more dorsal part of 
the TPJ is responsible for representing perspective differences and making behavioural 
predictions while the more ventral part of the TPJ is responsible for predicting behavioural 
consequences of mental states.  Finally, Jenkins and Mitchell (2008) demonstrated that TPJ 
was not consistently active during the processing of ambiguity in tasks which required 
participants to decode the ambiguity surrounding a character’s mental beliefs and 
preferences, but was for a task which required participants to differentiate between different 
19 
types of mental states.  What these various stimulus categories hold in common, pointing 
towards the role of the TPJ, is the need to reflexively update a set of interpretations given to 
online content/current perspectives in line with information retrieved from memory.  
Elevated PCC response to ambiguous scenarios in contrast to pragmatic intent 
supports the notion that the scenarios are drawing more upon mentalizing processes. PCC is 
consistently shown to be engaged during false-belief tasks (Schurz et al., 2014) as well as 
emotional processing (Maddok et al., 2003) including empathy (Völlm et al., 2006).  A role 
for PCC is consistently shown during internally-directed cognition (Leech & Sharp, 2013). 
Fransson and Marrelec (2008) suggest that the PCC is a key region in the neural network that 
sustains a sense of self-consciousness that is engaged in self-referential mental thoughts 
during rest. Additionally, a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on text comprehension 
showed a role for PCC in text coherence (Ferstl et al., 2008). That ambiguous scenarios were 
less familiar may be explained by the latter finding as participants expended more efforts to 
decode the coherence of unfamiliar sentences.  PCC activation reflects the extent to which 
interpretations of online content have been updated in line with information retrieved from 
memory (Ferstl et al., 2005, 2008).  
The two conditions used in the current study were equally ambiguous with the only 
difference being the speaker’s intentions behind the ambiguity. This might explain why 
previous studies that have contrasted elements of pragmatic language with literal sentences, 
without controlling adequately for the presence of general ambiguity that is unintentional and 
inherent to language, have recruited those core nodes of the ToM network during a pragmatic 
task. 
Self-referential memory and reasoning in the context of pragmatic intent 
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The combination of three areas in particular point towards the additional cognitive 
load of pragmatic language, beyond its associated ambiguity: the precuneus, anterior 
temporal, and superior parietal lobule.  The precuneus is a highly interwoven region, with 
functional connections to dorsolateral and dorsomedial PFC including BA’s 8, 10 and 46, as 
well as angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule (Margulies et al., 2009).  It is active across a 
wide range of cognitive tasks (Zhang & Chiang-shan, 2012), and its activity is generally 
interpreted to signal the extent to which self-referential knowledge is being accessed 
(Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Utevsky et al., 2014).  Its greater activity in response to the 
pragmatic scenarios here suggests that reasoning about the intent of pragmatic language is 
reliant upon drawing on past autobiographical experiences that overlap with the content of 
the particular scenario to some extent. That participants were more familiar with pragmatic 
scenarios than unintentionally ambiguous ones provides some support for this notion.  
Precuneus is considered to be a core node of the ToM network (Ciaramidaro et al., 
2007; Gallagher et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Rilling et al., 2004; Saxe & Kanwisher et 
al., 2003; Sommer et al., 2007): anterior temporal and superior parietal lobule less so.  
Activation within anterior temporal is, however, consistent with a greater reliance on 
autobiographical memory in reasoning about pragmatic language.  Also, an area active across 
numerous cognitive tasks, reviews of the evidence suggest that the anterior temporal stores 
semantic memory content that relates to personally-relevant experiences, abstracted to 
varying degrees (Hodgetts et al., 2017; Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012; Wong & Gallate, 2012).  
In language-specific tasks, for example, right anterior temporal is more active during ironic 
language, as opposed to literal language (Wakusawa et al., 2007), consistent with drawing on 
past personal experience in deriving an interpretation.  Superior parietal cortex has been 
demonstrated to support manipulation of online content (e.g. Koenigs et al., 2009, for 
manipulation of information in the context of a working memory task).  Perhaps here it 
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supported the adjustment of interpretations being attributed to pragmatic scenarios in line 
with an abstraction of evidence from past memories. 
 Finally, SMA [BA6] (Brunet et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000; Sommer et al., 2007; 
Vogeley et al., 2001) and occipital cortex (Brunet et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000; Mitchell 
et al., 2002, 2006; Völlm et al., 2006) are commonly more active during the processing of 
content that is argued to rely more on constructing a theory of mind. SMA is generally 
understood to support the preparation of motor responses, and occipital areas underlie 
perceptual analysis of visual content.  Perhaps the decision as to which choice to select was 
that bit more difficult for the pragmatic scenarios, which might have triggered the additional 
eye-movements.  Consistent with this, participants reported reduced confidence in their 
interpretation of pragmatic scenarios as opposed to the ambiguous ones.  In interpreting 
pragmatic content, we may have a ‘gut feeling’ that the hidden interpretation we identify is 
correct; however, uncertainty remains.  Once participants make an association between an 
ambiguous scenario and a particular choice, this may reduce uncertainty to a greater extent. 
 
Sex differences in pragmatic intent 
 In general, evidence suggests that women are better than men in pragmatic language 
comprehension and ToM or cognitive empathy (Frank et al., 2015). In the present study, 
females scored significantly higher than males on a measure of cognitive empathy (Reniers et 
al., 2011) supporting this claim. Although mPFC was generally less active during processing 
of pragmatic scenarios, it was more active in females compared to males.  It may be the case 
that, when faced with uncertainty while determining the mental state of another, females 
utilize the mPFC, at least more so than males, for more general inductive reasoning.  This 
finding is consistent with mPFC differences as a function of sex during a second-order false 
belief task (Frank et al., 2015).  IFG was also more active in females compared to males, a 
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region previously associated with emotional empathy (Dapretto et al., 2006; Schulte-Rüther 
et al., 2006), including humour understanding also related to ToM (Corcoran et al, 1997; 
Azim et al., 2005). Schulte-Rüther et al. (2006) concluded that the function of this region 
includes emotional interpersonal cognition, which is a key component of pragmatic speech 
interpretation. Findings show some support for Spunt and Lieberman (2013) who propose a 
dual-process model of the brain systems underlying action understanding and social 
cognition. Females may employ an affective empathy network involving modality-specific 
mirror neuron regions such as the IFG, as well as the cognitive empathy system involving 
ToM regions such as the mPFC (Spunt & Lieberman, 2013) to a greater extent than males. 
Both activation differences may go some way towards explaining why females here scored 
higher than males on the cognitive component of empathy. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that, while some core nodes of ToM, 
specifically mPFC, PCC, and TPJ, suffice in determining the meaning of ambiguous 
language, the additional recruitment of anterior temporal, precuneus, and superior parietal 
lobule, in calling upon self-referential knowledge, is required in determining the meaning of 
pragmatic language. Findings from this study also suggest that differences between males and 
females may exist in the structure of the neural network underpinning pragmatic language 
processing. Females showed greater activity in left mPFC, a region involved in cognitive 
empathy, as well as IFG, a region thought to subserve affective empathy. Such differences 
may explain the superior performance of females often noted on pragmatic language tasks. 
The findings suggest that, in future studies of pragmatic language, both in healthy and 
clinical (e.g. those with autism and schizophrenia) samples, an effort should be made to 
control for ambiguity.  More generally, they point towards the need to develop tasks that 
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differentiate the roles of different brain areas that contribute to our ability to reason about 
others’ minds.  
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of a single trial. The particular example used here is from 
the ambiguous condition. The scenario along with the utterance was presented for 10s, 
followed by the two target pictures with a blue border surrounding each picture for 5s. After 
this time the border of the two pictures changed to red for 2s, during which participants 
responded with the button box, followed by a fixation cross for 2s.  
Figure 2. Neuronal activation for the contrast: pragmatic > ambiguous sentences. Regions are 
shown in sagittal, coronal and axial planes, rendered on the surface of a single subject 
supplied by SPM12. MNI coordinates are given (x, y, z) for the most significant voxel in the 
cluster. Colour corresponds to z-scores. L=left-hemisphere, R=right-hemisphere; 
SMA=Supplementary motor area. 
Figure 3. Neuronal activation for the contrast: ambiguous > pragmatic sentences. Regions are 
shown in sagittal, coronal and axial planes, rendered on the surface of a single subject 
supplied by SPM12. MNI coordinates are given (x, y, z) for the most significant voxel in the 
cluster. Colour corresponds to z-scores. L=left-hemisphere, R=right-hemisphere; 
vmPFC=ventromedial prefrontal cortex, mPFC=medial prefrontal cortex, 
TPJ=temporoparietal junction, PCC=posterior cingulate cortex.  
Figure 4. Neuronal activation for the effect of sex on the contrast: pragmatic > ambiguous 
scenario’s. Results are for greater activity in females compared to males. Regions are shown 
in sagittal, coronal and axial planes, rendered on the surface of a single subject supplied by 
SPM12. MNI coordinates are given (x, y, z) for the most significant voxel in the cluster. 
L=left-hemisphere, R=right-hemisphere. Colour corresponds to z-scores. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics including mean scores and standard deviations (bracketed) for 
the variables: age, Intentionality and memory (as assessed using the Imposing Memory task 
(IMT)), along with familiarity and confidence scores for the ambiguous and pragmatic 
scenarios used in the fMRI task and the QCAE. Scores are given for the total sample and 
separated by sex.  
Table 2. Neuronal activity for the contrasts: ambiguous greater than pragmatic and pragmatic 
greater than ambiguous scenarios as well as sex differences for these two contrasts. Brain 
regions are shown for clusters identified from the two contrasts along with MNI coordinates 
for the most significant voxel (x,y,z mm) within the cluster, corresponding brain region for 
this voxel and closest Brodmann Area (BA) corresponding to that region. L=left-hemisphere; 
R=right-hemisphere. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics including mean scores and standard deviations (bracketed) for 
the variables: age, Intentionality and memory (as assessed using the Imposing Memory task 
(IMT)), along with familiarity and confidence scores for the ambiguous and pragmatic 
scenarios used in the fMRI task and the QCAE. Scores are given for the total sample and 
separated by sex.  
Male 
(N=13) 
Female 
(N=14) 
Total 
(N=27) 
IMT Intentionality score 4.91 (0.7) 5.02 (0.4) 4.97 (0.5) 
IMT Memory score 5.02 (0.6) 5.05 (0.4) 5.04 (0.5) 
Ambiguity: Familiarity  55.5 (7.1) 53.5 (10.5) 54.4 (8.9) 
Ambiguity: Confidence  63.0 (8.0) 61.9 (6.7) 62.4 (7.3) 
Pragmatic: Familiarity  63.3 (7.3) 63.4 (7.8) 63.4 (7.4) 
Pragmatic: Confidence  58.3 (7.1) 58.8 (5.6) 58.5 (6.2) 
QCAE: Cognitive  59.5 (7.3) 60.3 (7.6) 59.9 (7.3) 
QCAE: Affective 31.4 (6.3) 37.9 (8.0) 34.8 (7.8) 
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Table 2. Neuronal activity for the contrasts: ambiguous greater than pragmatic and pragmatic 
greater than ambiguous scenarios as well as sex differences for these two contrasts. Brain 
regions are shown for clusters identified from the two contrasts along with MNI coordinates 
for the most significant voxel (x,y,z mm) within the cluster, corresponding brain region for 
this voxel and closest Brodmann Area (BA) corresponding to that region. L=left-hemisphere; 
R=right-hemisphere. 
MNI 
coordinates 
Region BA Left/ 
Right 
k 
size 
X Y Z z-
score 
P-
value 
Brain activity related to Ambiguous > Pragmatic 
Ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex/orbitofrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
10 L 959 -12 32 -8 4.57 0.014 
Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 8 L 549 -22 24 56 4.52 0.015 
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 23 L 276 -2 -54 24 4.42 0.016 
Temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 40 L 23 -46 -66 36 3.78 0.022 
Inferior semilunar lobule/cerebellum R 180 44 -66 -46 4.76 0.014 
Lateral globus pallidus R 22 12 4 -6 3.74 0.023 
Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 8 R 16 22 28 56 3.44 0.035 
Angular gyrus 39 R 12 54 -72 8 3.42 0.035 
Brain activity related to Pragmatic > Ambiguous 
Superior occipital gyrus 19 L 251 -32 -90 26 5.12 0.014 
Supplementary motor area (SMA) 6 L 31 -6 -18 68 4.00 0.018 
Superior parietal lobule 5 L 37 -34 -46 68 3.94 0.018 
Superior parietal lobule 7 R 128 14 -42 78 5.01 0.014 
Anterior temporal (middle temporal 
gyrus) 
21 R 21 50 14 -38 4.36 0.016 
Precuneus 7 R 17 12 -82 48 3.52 0.031 
Superior occipital gyrus  19 R 28 34 -84 32 3.46 0.034 
Brain activity related to Pragmatic > Ambiguous 
     Females v Males 
Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 10 L 72 -10 44 16 3.55 0.001 
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 44 R 59 54 32 6 3.28 0.001 
     Males v females  
No regions showed a significant difference 
Brain activity related to Ambiguous > Pragmatic 
     Females v Males 
No regions showed a significant difference 
     Males v females 
No regions showed a significant difference 
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